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Abstract
We study the choice of the regulatory structure when a regulated firm engages
in different activities for different countries. Under decentralization each activity
is regulated independently and the contracts offered to the firm suffer from two
opposite distortions with respect to centralization: the competition between regula-
tory authorities forces them to offer too high-powered incentive contracts; however,
because the ownership structure of the firm is dispersed across the countries, each
regulator does not fully internalize the effect of his regulation on the firm’s rent
and contracts tend to be too low-powered. When the activities of the firm are suf-
ficiently substitutable we show that decentralization always leads to an inefficient
drift of the regulatory contracts towards fixed-price contracts. Nonetheless, when
regulators have private agendas and possess the discretion to distort their policy
to gain the support of some interest groups, then decentralization of the regula-
tory powers may be preferred to centralization as competition between regulatory
authorities eradicates their discretionary power.
JEL Classification: D72, H41, H70, L20.
Keywords: incentives, decentralization, regulation.
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1 Introduction
What is the proper level of decentralization for public policy and in particular regulation?
This question is very lively debated in federal states such as the USA or Brazil, as well as
in the European Union. It is a special case of a more general debate about the desirability
of multiple governments, with spatial specialization when we deal with decentralization,
with domain specialization when we are concerned with a regulator per industry, or with
functional specialization when we discuss the separation of regulation and competition
policy. In Europe, the concept of subsidiarity has been put forward to express the idea
that decentralization is desirable unless it entails too high coordination costs.
The optimality of the decentralization of public decision-making is an empty question
in a world of complete contracts with benevolent decision-makers. Indeed, in such a
setting, a centralized organization can always replicate the outcome of a decentralized
one. We must introduce a degree of incompleteness (in the informational structures, in
the sets of instruments or in the objectives) to create a trade-off between centralization
and decentralization. Some recent papers have discussed this trade-off with a clear view
of its foundation in terms of contractual limitations.1
In Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1996) the focus is on the decentralization of industrial
policies from the European level to the national level. If some variables are more likely
to be observed at the national level they show that it is always optimal to decentralize
part of the activities even in the presence of externalities between countries. Seabright
(1996) introduces the notion of accountability to justify the possible superiority of decen-
tralization. In his model, decentralization increases the accountability of the politicians
in charge of decision-making and this effect can balance the non internalized externalities.
Klibanoff and Poitevin (1997) rely on the lack of commitment power of the central govern-
ment to favor decentralization which induces a direct bargaining between regions. Also,
Olson and Torsvick (1993) and Martimort (1999) show that several regulators who leave
more rents to the regulated agent carrying substitute activities is a commitment device.
Laffont and Martimort (1998) show that the threat of collusion may lead the central gov-
ernment to delegate its authority when communication constraints alone would not yield
this result. Laffont and Zantman (1999) base the trade-off on the better informational
1See also Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Hart and Moore (1999), Gilbert and Picard (1996) for organizational
theories based on bounded rationality or implicit communication costs.
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structures of local politicians which are the joint products of local politics. Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999) and Laffont and Martimort (1998) show in different contexts how a
duality of regulators or supervisors is useful to provide incentives for regulators in charge
of tasks which create negative externalities the ones on the others.
In this paper we develop a simple regulatory model to debate some pros and cons of
decentralization or subsidiarity for the regulation of natural monopolies. Local favoritism,
multiprincipal externalities and political economy under incomplete information are the
main ingredients of the trade-offs we study. More precisely, we use the regulatory setting of
Laffont and Tirole (1993) in which a firm is in charge of two procurement activities.2 Each
regulator wants the firm to realize a country-specific project, and each project requires a
specific effort from the firm which has private information about its cost characteristics.
This informational advantage yields an (information) rent to the firm.
Under centralization, a unique regulator coordinates both decisions, whereas under
decentralization each activity is regulated independently. With benevolent regulators
suffering from asymmetric information with respect to the firm, decentralization suffers
from two distortions. The first one is related to the multiprincipal design of the model.
Because the actions taken by the firms are substitutes, each regulator is led to increase the
effort he requires from the firm in equilibrium: this is the competition effect. The second
effect is due to our specification of the ownership structure of the firm. We assume that
in each country some of the citizens hold some shares in the firm. Hence, the rent of the
firm goes back to the shareholders of each country. Under centralization, the regulator
takes into account the effect of his regulation on the whole rent of the firm that belongs
to the consumers of both countries. However, under decentralization, each regulator cares
only about the consumers and shareholders of his country. As a result, decentralization
leads the regulators to induce a too low effort level: this is the shared-rent externality.
When efforts are sufficiently substitutable we show that the competition effect is dom-
inant and in the limit this can lead the regulators to offer fixed-price contracts in equilib-
rium: decentralization makes rent extraction impossible and the firm earns a large rent
from the non coordination of the regulations.
Next, we consider that regulators may be captured. As in Laffont (1996) we consider
a random majority model and assume that the regulators act in favor of the majority in
2Similar results could be obtained with a regulation model with variable quantities as Laffont-Tirole
(1986) as well as with oligopolistic industries such as Auriol-Laffont (1992).
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power. In this case, we show that decentralization might be preferred as it reduces the
discretionary power of the decision-makers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the model with
benevolent regulators. In Section 3, we show that decentralization is equivalent to cen-
tralization when regulators are under complete information vis-a`-vis the firm. In Sections
4 and 5 we compare centralization and decentralization under asymmetric information.
Section 6 does the same comparison when the objectives of the regulators are biased in
favor of some citizens. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are gathered in appendices.
2 The model
We take a partial equilibrium approach and consider two countries (or regions) i = 1, 2 in
which a firm is realizing a project with (gross) value Si for the consumers of country i
3.
The firm can provide an effort ei in order to reduce the cost associated with project
i. The cost function of the firm for project i is Ci = β − ei where β is the intrinsic
efficiency parameter of the firm. We assume that the efficiency of the firm is the same for
both projects. Parameter β can take values in [β, β] according to a common knowledge
probability distribution with density f(.) and cdf F (.) satisfying the monotone hazard rate
condition ( d
dβ
F (β)
f(β)
≥ 0). In order to obtain explicit solutions we will sometimes illustrate
our solutions in the case of a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
The cost reducing efforts create a disutility to the firm equal to
ψ(e1, e2) =
1
2
(e21 + e
2
2) + γe1e2.
We assume that ∂
2ψ
∂e1∂e2
= γ > 0, or equivalently that the two efforts are substitutes from
the point of view of the firm. Note that the firm cannot manipulate costs4. Accounting
separation can be perfectly implemented but the firm can decide to allocate unobservable
effort in a way that maximizes its rent. Parameter γ belongs to [0, 1] and a high value
of this substitutability index means that effort can be easily substituted from one project
to the other (and conversely). Note that the disutility function is increasing and convex
in both efforts. We also assume that regulator i, denoted by Pi, fully reimburses the
3Throughout the paper, we will assume that Si is sufficiently large so that each regulator does not
want to shut down the realization of the project for some types of firm.
4See Laffont and Tirole (1993), chapter 12, for a model of regulation with cost padding.
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(observable) cost Ci of activity i
5and does not observe the realized cost on the other
activity. The gain of the firm is then given by
U = t1 + t2 − ψ(e1, e2)
where ti is the net transfer given by Pi.
In country i, Pi contracts with the firm for the realization of the (country specific)
project. When the regulatory structure is splitted like that, we assume that the contracts
are secret (Pi does not observe the contract proposed by regulator Pj to the firm), and
that regulators offer simultaneously contracts to the firm.
Each regulator must finance the realization of his project. In our partial equilibrium
approach, the shadow cost of public funds λ > 0 captures the distortionary effects of
taxation6. Regulator Pi maximizes the welfare in country i, equal to the net surplus of
the consumers/taxpayers plus a (so far) arbitrary sharing of the firm’s rent, given by
SWi = Si − (1 + λ)(ti + Ci) + δiU i = 1, 2
with δ1+δ2 = 1. These shares reflect the distribution of ownership between the consumers
of the two countries. We assume that 1 + λ − δi > 0, i = 1, 2, for rent extraction to be
desirable in both countries. Otherwise we would have to take into account individual
rationality constraints of consumers.
As is usual in the multiprincipal literature, we assume that if the firm decides to realize
a project, it must also realize the other project. If it refuses to participate at all then the
firm receives a reservation utility normalized to 07.
3 Full information benchmarks
In this section, we assume that the firm’s efficiency is publicly known; this implies that
the effort provided by the firm is also observable. We start with the case of a common
regulator (centralization) and then proceed with the situation where the two regulators
behave in a non cooperative way (decentralization).
5This is just an accounting convention.
6We assume it is the same for both countries.
7This is the intrinsic common agency setting as coined by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
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3.1 Centralized regulation
In this situation, a single regulator called Pc wants to maximize the sum of the welfares
in the two countries. Since he knows the efficiency parameter of the firm, he has only to
ensure that the firm is willing to participate. In other words, this regulator solves the
following program 

max
{t,e1,e2}
∑2
i=1 SWi
subject to U ≥ 0 ∀β ∈ [β, β].
Immediate algebra yields the solution to this program:
Proposition 1 Under centralization and complete information the optimal levels of effort
are symmetric8and are given by
e1(β) = e2(β) = e∗(β) =
1
1 + γ
.
Moreover, the firm gets no rent.
The intuition is clear: the marginal disutility of each effort must be equal to its marginal
cost saving effect. Because the public funds are costly it is optimal to leave no rent to the
firm: the (unique) transfer is designed in such a way that the rent of the firm is equal to
its reservation utility.
3.2 Decentralized regulation
When each regulator Pi knows the private information of the firm and when regulators
behave in a non cooperative way, we are back to the previous situation. Indeed, each
regulator can make the firm residual claimant of their relation, whatever the contract
proposed to the firm by the other regulator. We conclude this subsection with the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Under complete information, decentralization is equivalent to centraliza-
tion9.
8Under centralization, when γ = 1 only the sum of the efforts is determined in equilibrium. This holds
under complete and incomplete information.
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The coordination between regulators on how to share the payments to the firm is not
described by the model: only the sum of the transfers is determined10.
4 Centralized regulation under asymmetric informa-
tion
Asymmetric information has been recognized as being a major obstacle to first-best effi-
cient regulation. Following the new regulatory economics, we model the regulatory process
as a principal-agent problem in which the firm has a superior knowledge on its efficiency.
When the two regulators cooperate perfectly the problem is equivalent to a usual
adverse selection problem with a two-dimensional action11. According to the Revelation
Principle12, we can restrict ourselves to direct and truthful contracts: the outcome of
any regulation stipulating a transfer depending on the realized costs can be replicated
by a regulatory contract in which the firm reveals truthfully its private information.
These additional incentive compatibility constraints will undermine the efficiency of the
regulation and force the regulators to move away from the first-best (full information)
contract.
Let us now determine the requirements of incentive compatibility. We denote by
U(β; β˜) = t(β˜)− 1
2
[(β − C1(β˜))2 + (β − C2(β˜))2]− γ(β − C1(β˜))(β − C2(β˜))
the gain of a firm with true cost parameter β when it announces β˜ to the unique regulator.
The firm will reveal truthfully its private information if
β ∈ argmax
β˜
U(β; β˜) or

U˙(β) = −(1 + γ)[e1(β) + e2(β)]e˙1(β) + e˙2(β) ≤ 2
9When the action taken by a regulator directly affects the welfare of the other regulator (not just
through the rent of the firm), Martimort and Stole (1998) show that decentralization leads to multiple
equilibria (under complete and asymmetric information). Hence, in this case decentralization yields
different outcomes than centralization, even under complete information.
10This is due to the intrinsic common agency assumption. Had we assumed that the firm could decide
to realize a project for only one country, the optimal efforts would not have been changed; however, each
transfer would have been defined uniquely.
11See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for instance.
12See Gibbard (1973), Green and Laffont (1977) or Myerson (1979).
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where U(β) is the rent of the firm with type β when it announces the truth to the regulator.
The centralized regulator must still ensure that the firm is willing to participate to
the regulatory process, or that the firm earns a greater rent than its outside opportunity.
As is usual, we rewrite the objective function of the regulator in terms of efforts and
rent instead of costs and transfer. The program of the centralized regulator can then be
stated as follows:

max
{U(.),e1(.),e2(.)}
Eβ{S1 + S2 − (1 + λ)[2β − e1(β)− e2(β) + ψ(e1(β), e2(β))]− λU(β)}
subject to ∀β ∈ [β, β]
U˙(β) = −(1 + γ)[e1(β) + e2(β)]
e˙1(β) + e˙2(β) ≤ 2
U(β) ≥ 0.
We give the solution in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under asymmetric information and centralized regulation, the optimal
levels of effort are symmetric and are given by
e1(β) = e2(β) = ec(β) =
1
1 + γ
[1− (1 + γ) λ
1 + λ
F (β)
f(β)
].
Effort is distorted downwards, except for the most efficient firm. Indeed, because the rent
decreases with the efficiency parameter, the effort provided by less efficient firms must
be decreased in order to limit the rents of the more efficient ones. This is the standard
trade-off between rent extraction and incentive to effort: on the one hand, for efficiency
reasons the regulator would like to implement effort levels that are not too distorted with
respect to their first-best levels; on the other hand, the higher the effort required from
the firm, the larger the rent given up to the firm, and consequently the larger the social
cost due to this rent. Also, all firms, except the most inefficient one, earn a positive
rent. Asymmetric information forces the unique regulator to leave a positive, and socially
costly, rent to the firm in order to obtain truthful revelation of the private information.
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5 Decentralized regulation under asymmetric infor-
mation
We first start with a description of the way we solve this multiprincipal problem. The
methodology is borrowed from Martimort and Stole (1998). Then we compute the optimal
contracts.
The literature on common agency has exhibited many failures of a direct application
of the Revelation Principle. Once it becomes impossible to rely on direct mechanisms
to characterize the outcome of the common agency game, one has to consider indirect
mechanisms. A priori, these mechanisms are based on very general (and untractable)
spaces. However, Martimort and Stole (1998) have shown that there is no loss of generality
in restricting regulator Pi to use a non linear transfer based on the observable cost Ci
incurred by the firm on activity i13. Otherwise stated, it is useless to consider a more
complicated contract (that would include an extra-message sent by the firm).
Importantly, we know now that the optimal contract of a regulator for a given contract
proposed to the firm by the other regulator belongs to this class of mechanisms. Also,
from now on we will restrict ourselves to twice differentiable non linear deterministic
transfers14.
5.1 The problem of regulator P1
In this subsection, we characterize the best-response of the regulator in country 1 to
any contract proposed by the other regulator. First, for any non linear transfer t2(C2)
offered by P2 we can apply the Revelation Principle to find P1’s best-response. However,
different contracts proposed by P2 affect differently the firm’s incentives to produce for
P1 and therefore P1’s best-response. Consequently let us define the firm’s indirect utility
function as
Uˆ1(C1, β) = max
C2
{t2(C2)− 1
2
[(β − C1)2 + (β − C2)2]− γ(β − C1)(β − C2)}.
This indirect utility function gives the maximal gain of a β-type firm (excluding the
transfer received from regulator P1) for a given cost C1 on activity 1 when the firm
13They call this result the Taxation Principle. This result hinges on the quasi-linearity of the firm’s
utility function with respect to monetary transfers.
14This restriction is standard in the common agency literature.
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chooses optimally its cost level C2 on activity 2. Rewriting this function as Uˆ
1(β − e1, β)
we see that it determines the rate at which the firm must incur effort to compensate
for a lie on β, and therefore its information rent. Hence, under decentralization there
is an informational externality created by one regulator which affects the way the rival
regulator must design his contract. For further reference, we denote by C∗2(C1, β) the
cost on activity 2 which satisfies the first-order condition15associated with the previous
problem, that is
t′2(C
∗
2(C1, β)) + β − C∗2(C1, β) + γ(β − C1) = 0. (1)
Given a contract offered to the firm by P2, we can apply the Revelation Principle to
find the implementable contracts from the point of view of P1. A firm with type β will
reveal its private information if
β ∈ argmax
β˜
U(β˜; β) = t1(β˜) + Uˆ
1(C1(β˜), β).
Local incentive compatibility implies16
U˙(β) = Uˆ
1
β(C1(β), β)
C˙1(β)Uˆ
1
1β(C1(β), β) ≥ 0
where U(β) is now the rent of the firm in a truthful equilibrium. Immediate manipulations
enable us to rewrite P1’s problem as

max
{U(.),C1(.)}
Eβ{S1 − (1 + λ)[C1(β)− Uˆ1(C1(β), β)]− (1 + λ− δ1)U(β)}
subject to ∀β ∈ [β, β]
U˙(β) = Uˆ1β(C1(β), β)
C˙1(β)Uˆ
1
1β(C1(β), β) ≥ 0
U(β) ≥ 0.
15To consider the out of equilibrium behavior of the firm, the transfer t2(C2) has to be extended for
costs which may lie outside the set of equilibrium allocations in order that C∗2 (C1, β) be always defined
by the first-order condition (1). See Martimort (1992) for the construction of such extensions.
16Subscripts on the indirect utility function denote without ambiguity partial derivatives.
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If the equivalent of the Spence-Mirrlees condition, Uˆ11β(C1(β), β) ≥ 0, is satisfied, then
the local second-order condition reduces to C˙1(β) ≥ 0 and local incentive conditions are
sufficient for global incentive compatibility. This condition cannot be postulated a priori
as it depends endogenously on the contract proposed by the rival regulator. Hence, it
must be checked ex post at the equilibrium.
Moreover, we have expressed the optimization behavior of the firm with respect to
each regulator. It remains to check that it defines a global maximum for the firm (i.e.
that the firm is effectively willing to accept simultaneously both contracts in equilibrium).
5.2 The ambiguous effect of decentralization
When regulators do not cooperate we obtain the following proposition. To obtain a
symmetric equilibrium, we assume δ1 = δ2 =
1
2
.
Proposition 4 Under decentralization with asymmetric information the optimal profiles
of effort in a symmetric equilibrium are characterized by
e1(β) = e2(β) = ed(β) =
1
1 + γ
[1− (1 + γ)
1
2
+ λ
1 + λ
F (β)
f(β)
1− γ + 2γe˙d(β)
1 + γe˙d(β)
]
with initial condition ed(β) = e∗(β) and ed(β) ≤ e∗(β) for all β.
• If efforts are strongly substitutable (γ ≥ 1
1+2λ
) then all the optimality conditions are
satisfied and, moreover, ed(β) ≥ ec(β) for all β; therefore the rent of the firm is
larger under decentralization than under centralization.
• If efforts are weakly substitutable (γ < 1
1+2λ
) then the optimality conditions cannot
be checked directly and ed(β) might be larger or smaller than ec(β).
To understand in depth the two effects at work, let us first consider the case of unrelated
efforts (i.e. γ = 0). In this situation, the multiprincipal aspect disappears as the con-
tract offered by one regulator does not affect the choice of effort (or cost) by the firm
for the other regulator and the problems of the regulators become separable (up to the
participation constraint of the firm).
However, even in this case, decentralization is not equivalent to centralization for the
following reason. Under centralization, the regulator fully internalizes the impact of his
12
regulation on the rent of the firm that entirely goes to the consumers of both countries:
one unit of rent left to the firm has a social cost of (1 + λ)− 1 = λ.
Under decentralization, this is no longer the case. As a given regulator is only inter-
ested in the welfare of the consumers in his country, he does not internalize the effect of
his regulation on the fraction of the rent that accrues to the shareholders of the other
country. As a consequence, under decentralization, Pi’s perceived cost of one unit of rent
given up to the firm is (1 + λ)− δi which is larger than the social evaluation of the firm’s
rent under centralization. We call this effect the shared-rent externality.17
Let alone, the shared-rent externality has a clear impact on the regulatory contracts
offered to the firm under decentralization. Indeed, as the centralized regulator attaches
more weight to the firm’s rent than each decentralized regulator, the efforts under cen-
tralization tend to be higher than those under decentralization (as rent extraction is more
important under decentralization because the firm’s rent is more costly for each regula-
tor). Hence, the larger the firm’s rent the larger the distortion due to decentralization.
Obviously, this externality is present whatever the degree of substitutability of efforts.
Notice also that the larger the shadow cost of public funds λ, the less important the
shared-rent externality becomes as the discrepancy between the weight attached to the
firm’s rent under centralization and decentralization decreases (relatively to the weight of
the consumers’ surplus).
Finally, notice that this effect would have disappeared had we assumed that the share-
holders were not in the countries where the projects are realized18.
Secondly, let us explain the effect of decentralization on the power of the incentive
contracts when efforts are related (i.e. γ 6= 0). Under centralization, the unique regulator
completely coordinates the choice of efforts and anticipates that a firm maximizing its
profit will substitute one effort to the other in order to increase its rent.
Under decentralization, when regulator P1 requires an effort from the firm he also
anticipates, but cannot control for, that the firm will try to take advantage of the uncoor-
dinated regulations by substituting one effort to the other. Then P1 will require from the
firm to exert more effort than under a centralized regulation. In equilibrium, these antic-
ipations realize and indeed more effort is required by each regulator. Roughly speaking,
17Decentralization fails to internalize shared-rent externalities. It is an example of coordination failure
due to decentralization.
18This assumption is often made in the multiprincipal literature.
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regulators are competing for the firm and this behavior leads to an increase in the power
of the incentive contracts offered in equilibrium. This is the competition effect.19
Obviously, the more substitutable the efforts from the point of view of the firm are,
the larger the competition effect is and the larger the distortion due to decentralization
is.
When both effects are taken simultaneously into account, the total distortion due
to decentralization is ambiguous as the two effects previously mentioned go in opposite
directions. The shared-rent externality leads the decentralized regulators to offer lower-
powered contracts while the competition effect induces them to propose higher-powered
incentive regulations.
As stated in the proposition, one can nonetheless show that when γ ≥ 1
1+2λ
, i.e., when
efforts are sufficiently substitutable and/or the shadow cost of public funds is sufficiently
large, decentralization always results in larger efforts than centralization: the competi-
tion effect dominates the shared-rent externality, and the firm earns a larger rent under
decentralization. We give a surprising illustration of this in the next subsection.
Finally, the last part of the proposition is more technical and indicates that the ver-
ification of the optimality conditions becomes complex when the ranking of efforts is
ambiguous. In the appendices, we show that these conditions are always satisfied in the
uniform case. For this case efforts are linear20in the efficiency parameter and take the
same value for the most efficient firm. Comparing these efforts by computing the difference
between their slopes, we obtain
e˙d(β)− e˙c(β) ∝ γ(1 + 4λ)− 1 (uniform case)
which illustrates our discussion: for large values of the substitutability index, decentraliza-
tion leads to larger efforts than centralization (competition effect) whereas for low values
of the shadow cost of public funds, the reverse always holds (shared-rent externality).
19It is a second type of coordination failure due to decentralization.
20In general, the solutions are not linear and it could be possible that for some values of the efficiency
parameter ed(β) be larger than ec(β) whereas for other values the reverse would hold.
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5.3 The role of efforts allocation and the drift of regulatory
contracts towards fixed-price contracts
As explained earlier, the competition effect depends mainly on the substitutability of
efforts at the firm’s level. When efforts are sufficiently substitutable, then decentralization
leads to too large efforts.
One can also show that an increase in the degree of substitutability locally increases
the effort of the more efficient firms. The possibility to allocate easily its efforts on one
activity or the other hardens the competition effect. Competition between regulatory
authorities attains then its paroxysm when efforts are perfectly substitutable and in this
case, we can even prove the following result.
Proposition 5 When efforts are perfectly substitutable (γ = 1) there exists an equilib-
rium in which both regulators offer a fixed-price contract to the firm21.
When P2 offers a fixed-price contract to the firm, and when γ = 1, we show in the
appendices that Uˆ11β(C1(β), β) is equal to 0. This implies that the second-order condition
for implementability is (weakly) satisfied; however, this also implies that regulator P1 can
no longer distort the effort he requires to limit the firm’s rent, and cannot trade-off rent
extraction and efficiency.
This is a striking illustration of the drift of the regulatory contract. Efforts are equal
to the first-best efforts but the rent given up to the firm by the regulators becomes very
large. Competition between regulatory authorities leads to large inefficiencies and prevent
them from distorting their policy.
In the next section, we shall build on this insight.
21In the uniform case with perfectly substitutable efforts that we use in the next section there will be
two candidate solutions to the differential equation characterizing the optimal effort under decentraliza-
tion. However, for this case, the one that does not correspond to the fixed-price contract violates the
implementability conditions. It is immediate to show that this is also the case for all the probability
distributions with a linear hazard rate (F (β)f(β) = l(β − β), l > 0).
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6 The choice of the regulatory structure under po-
litical uncertainty
Political economy has often challenged the view that the regulatory authority acts as a
benevolent planner22. The goal of this section is to recognize that the authority in charge
of the regulation in each country has a private agenda; we take the example of politicians
who only seek to maximize their probability of being reelected23and look at the impact of
decentralization in such a setting. Another interpretation would be that the regulator(s)
can be captured by some interest groups that try to distort the regulation in their own
interest24.
Let us assume now that in the two regions there is a random proportion of shareholders
(resp. non shareholders) denoted by αi (resp. 1 − αi) ∈ [0, 1]. The shareholders of the
firm benefit from the rent of the firm while the non shareholders do not.
Before the value of αi, i = 1, 2, is known, the constitution decides which regulatory
structure (centralization or decentralization) to set up. However, this choice has to take
into account that the regulators in place will act in a distortive way. In our static frame-
work, we model this divergence between the objective of the regulator(s) and the interests
of all the citizens by recognizing that the regulator(s) only care(s) about the majority in
place.
Under decentralization, if αi >
1
2
, then there will be a (local) shareholder majority
in region i. In this case the objective of the regulator in region i will take into account
only the surplus of the shareholders in this region and the part of the rent of the firm
that accrues to these shareholders. On the contrary, when αi <
1
2
there will be a non
shareholder majority and the regulator in place will only care about the surplus of the
non shareholders. Accordingly, the objective function of the regulator of region i under
decentralization is given by25
SWi,d =

αi[Si − (1 + λ)(ti + Ci)] +
αi
α1+α2
U if αi >
1
2
,
(1− αi)[Si − (1 + λ)(ti + Ci)] if αi < 12 .
22See Buchanan(1965), Noll (1983) and Olson (1963) among others.
23See Laffont (1996).
24See Stigler (1971) for example and Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999) for a discussion of decentralization
in terms of relative captures of local and central government.
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Under centralization, the unique regulator cares only about the (national) majority
over both regions. His objective function will be
SWc =


∑2
i=1 αi[Si − (1 + λ)(ti + Ci)] + U if α1 + α2 > 1,∑2
i=1(1− αi)[Si − (1 + λ)(ti + Ci)] if α1 + α2 < 1.
To summarize, the different majorities have different stakes in the information rent of
the firm, and the regulators have private agendas depending on the majority in power.
Under centralization, the regulator will bias his regulation to favor the majority over both
regions; on the contrary, decentralization makes the regulators compete against each other
and act only in favor of the local majority. Notice also that both types of majority only
differ in their treatment of the firm’s rent.
The performances of these different regulatory structures have to be compared with
respect to the utilitarian criterion defined as usual by
SW u =
2∑
i=1
{Si − (1 + λ)(ti + Ci)}+ U.
In the following, we shall determine the profiles of effort implemented by each con-
stitution. Observe that under a shareholder majority the rent of the firm is overvalued
while under a non shareholder majority the rent of the firm is undervalued with respect
to the utilitarian criterion.
For expositional purposes, we restrict attention to the uniform case, with α1 = α2 = α
and with efforts perfectly substitutable for the firm (γ = 1)26. We also assume that
under a shareholder majority (1 + λ)α − 1
2
> (1 + λ)α − 1 > 0 for rent extraction to be
desirable under decentralization and centralization.
6.1 The profiles of effort
We can adapt our previous computations since only the weight of the firm’s rent is changed
in the objective function of the regulators. The optimal efforts are given in the next
25Letter ‘d’ (resp. ‘c’) stands for decentralization (resp. centralization).
26In a previous draft, we did not restrict ourselves to the case γ = 1. One can show that our insights
carry over (qualitatively) to the situations in which efforts are sufficiently substitutable. When the
proportion of shareholders in both regions can be different, decentralization may lead to non monotonic
profiles of efforts, but once again our argument could be extended to such cases.
17
proposition.
Proposition 6 The optimal profiles of effort are given by:
• Under centralization ec(β) = 12 [1 − 2rcβ] where rc = 1 under a non shareholder
majority and rc =
(1+λ)α−1
(1+λ)α
under a shareholder majority.
• Under decentralization ed(β) = 12 whatever the majority.
• With the utilitarian criterion eu(β) = 12 [1− 2 λ1+λβ].
This proposition calls for some comments. Under centralization, the optimal profile of
effort fluctuates with the majority in place. Under a shareholder majority the effort is
larger than the one corresponding to the utilitarian criterion as the regulator in place
accounts for the share of the firm’s rent that goes to the actual majority27. On the
contrary, under a non shareholder majority effort is downward distorted with respect to
its utilitarian level.
The decentralization of the regulatory powers leads to the striking result that the
implemented efforts become insensitive to the majority in place. As explained earlier,
this result comes from the perfect substitutability of the efforts provided by the firms
which exacerbates the tension between the non cooperative regulators. This competition
between institutions finally ends up with the regulators being forced to offer fixed-price
contracts without the possibility to match the will of the majority in place with the effort
required from the firm: decentralization leads to uniform policies with respect to the
political majority.
When the non shareholders have the majority, the effort is too low under centraliza-
tion and too high under decentralization. However, immediate computations show that
decentralization distorts less the effort than centralization when the shadow cost of public
funds is small (λ < 1). Hence, if the efficiency consideration is more important than the
rent extraction one, it is intuitive that under a non shareholder majority decentralization
is preferred. This will be confirmed in the next subsection in which we perform some
welfare comparisons.
27More precisely, this is due to the fact that the centralized regulator only cares about the shareholders
which implies that the relative weight of the firm’s rent (with respect to the weight attached to the net
consumers’ surplus) is larger under centralization than with the utilitarian criterion.
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Under a shareholder majority, both constitutions lead to too high effort levels. How-
ever, immediate computations show that centralization distorts less the effort than cen-
tralization under the assumption (1 + λ)α > 1. Notice that when the proportion of
shareholders is large (i.e. α close to 1) then the objective of the centralized regulator
almost coincides with the utilitarian criterion, and the loss entailed by decentralization
is large. In a similar way, the larger the social cost of public funds is, the more desirable
centralization is.
Hence, the comparison between centralization and decentralization is ambiguous. On
the one hand, centralization enables to implement efforts that limit the rent earned by the
firm while decentralization always leaves too large rent to the firm. On the other hand,
centralization is sensitive to the majority in place and leads to fluctuations in the levels of
effort that favor the members of the majority. The comparison between centralization and
decentralization hinges simultaneously on the proportion of shareholders/non shareholders
and on the shadow cost of public funds, which gives a measure of the social cost of the
firm’s rent. Effort levels are represented in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
6.2 Welfare analysis
To assess the performances of centralization and decentralization, we must then compare
the expected welfares of both countries under the different constitutions. For a given
majority with size α that implements the profile of efforts e(β, α), the expected social
welfare is given by
Eβ{SW u(e(β, α))} =
∫ β
β
{S1 + S2 − (1 + λ)[ψ(e(β, α)) + 2(β − e(β, α))]− λU(β)}dF (β).
Whatever the regulatory structure, the rent of the firm in a symmetric equilibrium is
given by
U˙(β) = −4e(β, α)
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which gives (after an integration by parts) in the uniform case
Eβ{SW u(e(β, α))} = S1 + S2 − (1 + λ)− 2
∫ 1
0
{(1 + λ)e(β, α)[e(β, α)− 1] + 2λβe(β, α)}dβ.
Depending on the majority in place, the expected welfare under centralization is given
by28
SW
u
c,s = S1 + S2 − (1 + λ) + 4(2α−1)−α
2(1−λ2)
6α2(1+λ)
with a shareholder majority,
SW uc,ns = S1 + S2 − (1 + λ)− 1−λ6 with a non shareholder majority.
Under decentralization, because efforts are not dependent on the majority in place,
the expected welfare of both countries is
SW ud,s = SW
u
d,ns = S1 + S2 − (1 + λ) +
1− λ
2
whatever the majority.
Then, the difference between the welfare under centralization and the one under de-
centralization is
SW
u
d,s − SW uc,s = 23 (1−α)
2−α2λ2
α2(1+λ)
under a shareholder majority, (α > 1/2)
SW ud,ns − SW uc,ns = 23(1− λ) under a non shareholder majority. (α < 1/2)
We assume that the probabilities to have a shareholder majority and a non shareholder
majority are the same (equal to 1
2
). This enables us to state the following proposition.29
Proposition 7 If the shadow cost of public funds is large (λ ≥ 1) then centralization is
preferred to decentralization. On the contrary, when the shadow cost of public funds is
low (λ ≤ 1/√2) then decentralization is preferred to centralization.
For intermediate values of the shadow cost of public funds (1/
√
2 < λ < 1), then de-
centralization (resp. centralization) is preferred to centralization (resp. decentralization)
when the shareholder majority is weak (resp. large).30
28Letter ‘s’ (resp. ‘ns’) stands for shareholder (resp. non shareholder) majority.
29Under a shareholder majority, the assumption (1 + λ)α > 1 implies that (1− α)2 − α2λ2 < 0.
30The size of the non shareholder majority does not affect the effort levels.
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This proposition confirms the intuitions derived from the comparison of the effort levels.
Indeed, when the shadow cost of public funds is large, then the rent left to the firm has
a large social cost. Moreover, under decentralization the competition between regulatory
authorities provides the firm with excessive rent. These two effects work in favor of
centralization and give the rationale for the first part of the proposition.
When the shadow cost of public funds is small then decentralization is preferred under
a non shareholder majority. Moreover, even if centralization is preferred under a share-
holder majority, the loss entailed by decentralization tends to be small. Hence, the former
effect more than offsets the latter, and decentralization is preferred.
For intermediate values, the trade-off also depends on the size of the majority in power.
The drawback of centralization is that the unique regulator only cares about the majority.
Hence, when the size of the majority is small, the proportion of consumers disadvantaged
by the centralized regulator tends to be relatively large and decentralization becomes the
preferred constitution even though it provides the firm with too much rent (which has a
low social cost if λ is not too large). Decentralization serves to limit the discretionary
power of the regulators.
7 Conclusion
We have compared the performances of centralization and decentralization of the regula-
tory powers using the new regulatory economics and without appealing to any informa-
tional advantage under decentralization or externalities between countries.
In this setting, the benefit of centralization of the regulatory power at a supranational
level is to coordinate the regulations and to take into account the informational externality
created by the link between both activities at the firm’s level.
Decentralization is plagued by two opposite distortions. The first relates to the in-
formational externality which translates into a competition effect when efforts are substi-
tutes. The second comes from the fact that a regulator does not internalize the impact of
his regulation and the fraction of the firm’s rent that accrues to the shareholders of the
other country.
If efforts were complements instead of substitutes then the competition effect would
be reversed31: a regulator would free-ride on the incentives provided to the firm by the
other regulator and this would lead to too low-powered incentive contracts in equilib-
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rium. Moreover, this under-provision of incentives would be reinforced by the shared-rent
externality.
Then, we introduced a bias in the objective of the regulator. Using the random ma-
jority model, in which the regulator only cares about the majority in place, we show
that decentralization could perform better than centralization. Indeed, decentralizing the
decision power modifies the political rules of the game played by the decision-makers
and creates a competition between regulators. In our setting, this competition eliminates
the negative discretionary power of the regulators at the cost of providing the firm with
excessive rent. This effect would be still present if efforts were complements as decen-
tralization would still reduce the distortion under a shareholder majority. In the same
vein, introducing a degree of ‘competitiveness’ (through, say, an unregulated fringe in
each country producing an imperfectly differentiated product) in our model would just
modify the equilibrium rent of the regulated firm but would not alter qualitatively our
conclusions.
31With complements, there exists a continuum of equilibria that always lead to lower effort than
centralization.
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8 Appendices
8.1 Complete information
Under centralization, because the rent is socially costly, the regulator sets U = 0. Then
replacing the value of the transfer in the objective function and optimizing with respect
to efforts we obtain the first-best efforts.
Under decentralization the same methodology can be applied directly.
8.2 Centralized regulation under asymmetric information
As the rent is (strictly) decreasing in the efficiency parameter and because the rent is
socially costly, the participation constraint amounts to U(β) = 0. The Hamiltonian
associated with the corresponding optimal control problem is
H = f(β)[S1 + S2 − (1 + λ)(2β − (e1(β) + e2(β))
+
1
2
(e1(β)
2 + e2(β)
2) + γe1(β)e2(β))− λU(β)]− η(β)(1 + γ)[e1(β) + e2(β)].
Applying the Maximum Principle we get η˙(β) = λf(β). Because there is no transversality
condition at β, η(β) = 0 and we obtain η(β) = λF (β). Then optimizing with respect to
ei(β) we obtain the optimal profiles of effort. Finally, under the monotone hazard rate
assumption, d
dβ
F (β)
f(β)
≥ 0, the second-order condition for implementability is satisfied.
8.3 Decentralized regulation under asymmetric information
8.3.1 Preliminary results
Immediate computations yield
• Uˆ11 (C1, β) = (β − C1) + γ(β − C∗2(C1, β)),
• Uˆ1β(C1, β) = −(1 + γ)(β − C1 + β − C∗2(C1, β)),
• Uˆ11β(C1, β) = (1 + γ)(1 + ∂C
∗
2 (C1,β)
∂C1
),
where C∗2(C1, β) is defined by the first-order condition (1) associated with the indirect
utility function of the firm vis a` vis regulator P2.
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Differentiating this condition with respect to C1 we obtain
[t′′2(C
∗
2(C1(β), β))− 1]
∂C∗2(C1(β), β)
∂C1
= γ. (2)
In equilibrium, C∗2(C1(β), β) = C2(β). Substituting in (1) and differentiating with respect
to β we also get
[t′′2(C2(β))− 1]C˙2(β) = −1− γ(1− C˙1(β)). (3)
Using (2) and (3), we obtain
Uˆ11β(C1(β), β) = (1 + γ)
1 + γ − γ(C˙1(β) + C˙2(β))
1 + γ(1− C˙1(β))
.
8.3.2 The symmetric equilibrium
The optimal schedules of effort As Uˆ1β(C1, β) < 0 and because the rent is socially
costly, the participation constraint amounts to U(β) = 0. The Hamiltonian associated
with the problem of regulator P1 is
f(β)[S1 − (1 + λ)(C1(β)− Uˆ1(C1(β), β))− (1
2
+ λ)U(β)] + η(β)Uˆ1β(C1(β), β).
Applying the Maximum Principle and using the fact that there is no transversality con-
dition at β (η(β) = 0), we obtain η(β) = (1
2
+λ)F (β). Finally, optimizing with respect to
C1(β), considering a symmetric equilibrium and rearranging terms we obtain the optimal
effort profiles.
Behavior of the solution in the neighborhood of β In order to compare the ef-
forts under centralization and decentralization, we must first linearize the solution to the
differential equation in the neighborhood of β. We have
e˙d(β) = −1
γ
(1 + γ)ed(β)− 1 + (1 + γ)(1− γ)F (β)f(β)
1
2
+λ
1+λ
(1 + γ)ed(β)− 1 + 2(1 + γ)F (β)f(β)
1
2
+λ
1+λ
. (4)
Let us use the following notations: X = ed(β) − ed(β) and Y = β − β. Immediate
computations show that (4) can be rewritten as
dX
dY
= −1
γ
X + (1− γ) 12+λ
1+λ
Y
X + 2
1
2
+λ
1+λ
Y
.
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Looking for a solution of the form X = tY , we must solve the following equation:
γt2 + (2
1
2
+λ
1+λ
γ + 1)t + (1− γ) 12+λ
1+λ
= 0. The two roots are given by
td = −
1 + 2γ
1
2
+λ
1+λ
+
√
∆
2γ
and td =
−1− 2γ 12+λ
1+λ
+
√
∆
2γ
.
where ∆ = 1 + 4γ2
1
2
+λ
1+λ
(1 +
1
2
+λ
1+λ
) > 0 is the discriminant. It is immediate to show that
• td does not satisfy the optimality conditions of the firm’s maximization problem
given by (5),
• td < e˙∗(β),
• td > e˙c(β) = − λ1+λ ⇔ γ > 11+4λ .
Comparative statics Let us consider the effect of an increase in the substitutability
index γ on the optimal effort under non cooperative regulations. In the neighborhood of
β immediate computations yield Sg( dt
dγ
) = Sg(1− 1√
∆
) > 0. Hence efforts increase locally,
and globally in the uniform case, around β when γ increases.
Let us now prove that ed(β) ≤ e∗(β). First consider βˆ such that ed(βˆ) = e∗(βˆ). At βˆ
we have e˙d(βˆ) = −1−γ2γ ≤ e˙∗(βˆ) = 0. Hence, for β ∈ (βˆ − ², βˆ) we have ed(β) > e∗(β), a
contradiction.
Let us find the conditions such that ed(β) ≥ ec(β) ∀β. Consider βˆ such that ed(βˆ) =
ec(βˆ). Equation (4) gives
e˙d(βˆ) =
γλ− 1
2
(1− γ)
γ(1 + λ)
.
Now assume that γλ − 1
2
(1 − γ) ≥ 0 or γ ≥ 1
1+2λ
. Then e˙d(βˆ) ≥ 0 while e˙c(βˆ) ≤ 0
which in turn implies that ∀β ∈ (βˆ − ², βˆ), ed(β) < ec(β). However, this contradicts the
fact that if γ ≥ 1
1+2λ
≥ 1
1+4λ
then td > e˙c(β). Note finally that this a sufficient condition
only.
The implementability conditions Let us check that the indirect utility function
satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees property at the equilibrium. We have Uˆ11β(C1(β), β) = (1 +
γ)(1+
∂C∗2 (C1(β),β)
∂C1
) = (1+γ)1−γ+2γe˙d(β)
1+γe˙d(β)
= −(1+γ) (1+γ)ed(β)−1
(1+γ)
F (β)
f(β)
1
2+λ
1+λ
≥ 0 because ed(β) ≤ e∗(β)
∀β.
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We check now for the monotonicity of the cost profile:
C˙d(β) ≥ 0⇔ 1− e˙d(β) ≥ 0⇔ 1 + γ
γ
(1 + γ)ed(β)− 1 + (1 + γ)F (β)f(β)
1
2
+λ
1+λ
(1 + γ)ed(β)− 1 + 2(1 + γ)F (β)f(β)
1
2
+λ
1+λ
≥ 0,
which is satisfied if γ ≥ 1
1+2λ
, since we have shown that under this condition ed(β) ≥ ec(β).
The optimality conditions for the firm We also must check that the problem of the
firm is globally concave, or that the Hessian associated with the following maximization
problem
max
C1(β),C2(β)
{t1(C1(β)) + t2(C2(β))− 1
2
[(β − C1(β))2 + (β − C2(β))2]− γ(β − C1(β))(β − C2(β))}
is definite semi-negative at the equilibrium. This is equivalent to the following two con-
ditions 
t
′′(C(β))− 1 ≤ 0
(t′′(C(β))− 1)2 − γ2 ≥ 0
⇔

1 + γe˙d(β) ≥ 01− γ + 2γe˙d(β) ≥ 0. (5)
We have
1− γ + 2γe˙d(β) = −(1 + γ) (1 + γ)ed(β)− 1
(1 + γ)ed(β)− 1 + 2(1 + γ)F (β)f(β)
1
2
+λ
1+λ
which is positive since we have shown that e∗(β) ≥ ed(β).
Simple computations yield
1 + γe˙d(β) =
(1 + γ)F (β)
f(β)
1
2
+λ
1+λ
(1 + γ)ed(β)− 1 + 2(1 + γ)F (β)f(β)
1
2
+λ
1+λ
which is positive under the assumption γ ≥ 1
1+2λ
since we have shown that in this case
ed(β) ≥ ec(β).
8.3.3 Solution in the uniform case
The methodology used to compute the solution under decentralization in the uniform case
is explained in the general case in section 8.4.1. It suffices to take rd =
1
2
+λ
1+λ
in equations
(6). The comparisons with the solution under centralization is immediate and left to the
reader.
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8.3.4 The fixed-price contract equilibrium
Assume that R2 offers a fixed-price contract to the firm and that γ = 1. Then
∂C∗2 (C1,β)
∂C1
=
−1 implying Uˆ11β(C1, β) = 0 and ed(β) = e∗(β). This profile of efforts can be implemented
with a fixed-price contract.
8.4 The choice of the regulatory structure under political un-
certainty
8.4.1 Decentralization
For region i with a majority of δi the social welfare function of the local regulator can be
rewritten as follows:
SWi = δi[Si − (1 + λ)(Ci(β)− Uˆ i(Ci(β), β))]− [(1 + λ)δi − αi
α1 + α2
I{αi> 12}]U(β).
where I is the indicator function. Define rd,i =
(1+λ)δi− αiα1+α2 I{αi> 12 }
(1+λ)δi
and δi = αi if αi >
1
2
or
δi = 1−αi if αi < 12 . Then, up to coefficient of the rent U(β) in the social welfare function,
the computations of the optimal profiles of efforts are similar. The implementability
conditions are unchanged.
Lemma 1 With decentralization, the optimal profiles of effort under asymmetric infor-
mation are characterized by
e1(β) + γe2(β) = 1− rd,i(1 + γ)
F (β)
f(β)
1−γ+γ[e˙1(β)+e˙2(β)]
1+γe˙1(β)
γe1(β) + e2(β) = 1− rd,i(1 + γ)F (β)f(β) 1−γ+γ[e˙1(β)+e˙2(β)]1+γe˙2(β)
with the initial conditions e1(β) = e2(β) = e∗(β).
In the uniform case, when α1 = α2 = α then rd,1 = rd,2 = rd. When assume that
(1+λ)α > 1
2
for rent extraction to be desirable under a shareholder majority. We will look
for linear and symmetric solutions of the form ei = aβ + b. Differentiating the optimality
conditions, we obtain the following condition
a = −rd1− γ + 2γa
1 + γa
. (6)
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Solving (6) yields two candidate solutions. One can then show that one solution always
fails to satisfy the optimality conditions of the firm’s maximization problem (5) and can
then be discarded from the analysis. We end up with
a =
−1− 2γrd +
√
∆
2γ
,
where ∆ = 1 + 4γ2rd(rd + 1) > 0. We deduce then that b =
1
1+γ
.
Now we check that 1 + γa ≥ 0. If 1 − 2γrd ≥ 0 then this condition is automatically
satisfied. Otherwise this condition can be rewritten as γ(1 + γ)rd ≥ 0 which obviously
holds.
Now we must check that 1− γ + 2γa ≥ 0. This condition is equivalent to 1− γ2 ≥ 0
which obviously holds.
Now we check that C˙(β) ≥ 0 or equivalently a ≤ 1. This amounts to γ(1+γ)(1+rd) ≥
0 which obviously holds.
Finally, when γ = 1, one can check immediately that the solutions are a = 0 or
a = −1 − 2rd. The last solution does not satisfy the optimality conditions of the firm’s
maximization problem (5).
8.4.2 Centralization
In the uniform case, with α1 = α2 = α and (1+λ)α > 1 for rent extraction to be desirable
under a shareholder majority, immediate computations (adapted from section 8.2) show
that the optimal profiles of effort are given by
e1(β) = e2(β) = ec(β) =
1
1 + γ
[1− (1 + γ)rcβ],
where rc =
(1+λ)α−1
(1+λ)α
under a shareholder majority and rc = 1 under a nonshareholder
majority.
8.4.3 Expected welfares comparison
Notice first that the proportion of shareholders appears only under a shareholder majority.
With a slight abuse of notations, α represents now the proportion of shareholders under
a shareholder majority (i.e. α > 1
2
).
If λ ≥ 1 then centralization is preferred whatever the majority.
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Assume now that λ < 1. If both types of majority have the same probabilities (1
2
),
then the difference between the expected welfare under decentralization and the expected
welfare under centralization is proportional to
P (α) = 2α2(1− λ2)− 2α + 1. (7)
We must have (1 + λ)α > 1 or λ > 1−α
α
, with α > 1/2.
The discriminant associated to P (α) is 4(2λ2 − 1). Consequently, if λ2 < 1/2 then
the discriminant is negative and P (α) > 0 for all values of α and λ (as 1 − λ2 > 0 by
assumption).
Assume now that λ2 > 1/2. The largest of the two roots associated to P is
1 +
√
2λ2 − 1
2(1− λ2)
which is larger than 1 when λ < 1. On the contrary, the smallest of the two roots is
1−√2λ2 − 1
2(1− λ2) ,
and is smaller than 1. It is larger than 1/2 because 1−√2λ2 − 1 ≥ 1−λ2 ⇔ λ2 ≥ √2λ2 − 1
⇔ (1 − λ2)2 ≥ 0, which obviously holds. Finally notice that P (1/2) = 1/2(1 − λ2) > 0
and P (1) = 1− 2λ2 < 0 from our assumptions.
If λ2 = 1/2 then there is a unique solution: α = 1.
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Figure 1: The profiles of effort.
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